

# What future for development policy ?

Poor cousin or equal partner in the EU's external relations policies ?



EU development policy faces an almost unprecedented number of challenges over the next five years. The EU constantly states its ambition of being an ever more effective player on the global stage and its external policies will be subject to a wide range of changes. The draft Constitution, expected to be approved in June, will seek to improve coherence in foreign policy by fusing the Commissioner for external relations with the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy in the new guise of a European Foreign Minister. The new Commission due to take office in November will have to decide whether to continue with a Commissioner dedicated to development policy and there are questions about that person's powers over policy and spending. The Union will have to settle its budget for the next seven years by the end of 2005 and there will be battles over spending priorities. Development policy will find itself competing with other sectors for scarce public funds. The enlargement of the Union to take in ten new members on May 1 will inevitably increase the Union's focus on its near neighbours. Meanwhile, the EU is starting to apply strategic security thinking to its relations with the rest of the world. The priority given to fighting global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and illegal immigration will increasingly influence the EU's approach to other countries and the assistance that they receive from the Union.

At the same time, these influences could present opportunities for EU development policy as well as threats. A greater focus on regional stability through a security perspective and a better assessment of whether the security situation makes development efforts possible could increase the effectiveness of aid delivery. Increasing willingness to support intervention whether through military or civilian crisis management methods could lead to a longer term commitment in regions where the EU has until now preferred not to get involved.

The aim of this report, based on over twenty interviews with officials from the member states, the European Commission and MEPs, is to examine how these different elements will impact on EU development policy over the next five years. It is intended to indicate where development objectives could be at risk and highlight areas where development actors should concentrate their activities to obtain the best outcome in terms of impact on people living in poor and marginalised communities in developing countries. With so many open questions the outlook is uncertain. This report aims to contribute to the ongoing debates in these policy areas without drawing definitive conclusions at this stage.

This report was written for ActionAid International by Simon Taylor, a freelance journalist, and is based on the insights of a number of MEPs, Commission and Council officials, Member State representatives from the EU25, think tank and NGO representatives. Interviewees gave freely of their time and opinions on the understanding that individuals would not be quoted directly in this report.

## I. DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EU EXTERNAL POLICY

It is useful at the beginning of this exercise to be clear about the role of development policy in relation to the EU's external policies as a whole. The concept of policy coherence was an innovation introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1993). It was required that other EU policies be coherent with the EU's development policy rather than the other way around. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) introduced the concept of "consistency", emphasising that all policies be consistent with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Development policy currently therefore represents one facet of the wide range of external policies of the Union alongside trade, technical assistance, environmental policy, etc. Decisions in these areas (known as the first pillar in EU jargon) are taken according to the Community method, i.e. on the basis of a proposal from the Commission with the member states voting by qualified majority and with the involvement of the European Parliament, either through consultation or in codecision. These external policies are separate from the EU's foreign policy or Common Foreign and Security Policy which involves what might be called the diplomatic side of policy-making, i.e. positions on foreign policy questions of the day such as regional crises, conflicts or political developments. Policy in this area is determined by the member states voting in unanimity. Under CFSP the EU has also developed a Common Security and Defence Policy to enable the EU to deal with crisis management, launched by the Anglo-French summit in St Malo in December 1998 and endorsed at the Helsinki summit one year later. To this end it has set itself the ambition of creating a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and able to stay in the field for a year. To complement this, the Union is also setting up a police force of 5000 officers for international missions of which 1000 should be deployable within less than 30 days. It is also creating a pool of Rule of Law experts covering a broad spectrum of functions in civilian administration and, for civil protection, two or three assessment teams that could be dispatched within 3-7 hours as well as

intervention teams of up to 2000 persons for deployment at short notice. To implement this policy, the Union has created a Political and Security Committee, a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, a Military Committee and a Political-Military Group. In addition, a military staff composed of military experts seconded by the Member States has been set up.

In terms of development policy, the Commission and Council approved a joint statement in November 2000. It stated that the main focus of Community development policy must be to reduce and, eventually, to eradicate poverty. This objective entails support for sustainable economic and social and environmental development, promotion of the gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and a determination to combat inequality. It also states that promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance are an integral part of development policy. The statement says the Community will concentrate on six areas which have been identified on the basis of added value of Community action and of their contribution to poverty reduction. These are: the link between trade and development; regional integration and cooperation; support for macro-economic policies and the promotion of equitable access to social services, transport, food security and sustainable development; and institutional capacity building. The Commission is expected to draw up a new statement on development policy which will reflect the EU's commitment, to meet the Millennium Development Goals. This includes raising levels of development assistance as a percentage of EU average and meeting the 0.7% target for aid spending as a percentage of national GNI.

## *EU development policy*

### *Challenges, threats and opportunities*

## EU development policy

### Challenges, threats and opportunities

#### 2. DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN AN INCREASINGLY SECURITY- DRIVEN WORLD

There is no question that EU development policy is operating in a more complex policy environment than before. The EU has developed its own foreign policy and security identity over the last ten years in response to its past failures to deal with regional crises like those in the Balkans. As a result it has decided to equip itself with both military and civilian tools for crisis management including a 60,000 strong intervention force. It has entered into an agreement with NATO to use the military alliance's assets for peacekeeping missions where NATO as a whole does not want to be involved. This year, for example, the EU is likely to take over from NATO the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Union has already launched military and police operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and a small mission in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the same time the increasing awareness of threats to security from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spate of terrorist attacks have required the Union to think about the causes of such phenomenon and how it deals with them.

All these factors have forced the Union to think about the balance between security concerns and development objectives in a way that was inconceivable before the 1990s. As one researcher put it: "The golden days of no other priorities are over," pointing out that many of the debates which are taking place in the EU now about the interaction between development and wider foreign policy have been going on for years in other international organisations like the UN or the OECD. There was a very broad consensus among the twenty-odd interviewees that development policy could not operate in isolation from other policy concerns even if the risk of an imbalance should be guarded against. As one member state official expressed it: "There is a general acceptance that the two sides have to work hand in hand. Development and security are two equally important facets". There was also a very strong

sense that the worst that could happen to development policy would be for it to remain a policy in isolation which did not impact other policy areas. "What would marginalise development would be to leave it in a corner", commented one member state official.

Many interviewees stressed that the attempt to integrate development policy with other policy areas was a fact that would not go away and emphasised that development community actors needed to face up to the realities of the debate in order to maintain their influence. "What is required from the development community is that they accept that the challenges are changing and only doing a long-term poverty reduction focus is not what the member states want to do".

Several participants pointed out that the EU was finally getting to grips with the interconnection of development policy with other security concerns, not least because otherwise the effectiveness of development policy was at stake. "This is not new. It has become development mainstream", commented one Commission official. "If you look at Cote d'Ivoire we have poured in billions and 30 years of development work went down the drain in one conflict. If you don't tackle conflict prevention at the same time as development policy you're getting nowhere".

EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten specifically addressed the role of development policy within the range of external actions in a key speech given to the Overseas Development Institute on November 7, 2003. He argued that the draft Constitution drawn up by the Convention (see below) states that "Union policy in the sphere of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action" which include "fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty".

## *EU development policy*

### *Challenges, threats and opportunities*

Patten stressed the importance of development policy in addressing the current global challenges (see the Section on the EU Security Strategy below). “Development policy and other cooperation programmes provide without doubt the most powerful instruments at the Community’s disposal for treating the root causes of conflict”. He underlined the point that there cannot be development without peace, highlighting the fact that of the world’s 40 poorest countries, 214 were either in armed conflict or have only recently emerged from armed conflict while a fifth of the population of Africa live in conflict zones.

Recently the response of the EU to foreign policy challenges like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction has been to emphasise a holistic approach to these problems, recognising the need to tackle poverty as the basis for regional instability, conflict, illegal migration and state failure, as the EU Security Strategy stresses. But all actors in the field are aware of the dangers of development aims being subordinated to wider foreign policy goals even if they are sceptical that those fears could be realised in practice. “Our concern is the extent to which development objectives will be subsumed within security goals. Unless people are vigilant in the development community, governments, NGOs and civil society, there is the risk of an imbalance where there are strong concerns about, say migration, or the war on terrorism”, said one member state official. “Development policy shouldn’t be instrumentalised. It’s important for the development community to see the balance is maintained and that it’s not one to the exclusion of the other”.

While Patten argued strongly for the mutual interdependence of security concerns and development policy, he insisted that this did not mean subjecting decisions on development policy to security imperatives. While the fears of the development community were “well-justified”, he maintained any tendency to create a hierarchy of policy areas, where development would become subservient to CFSP, should be avoided. What mattered, he argued, was to strive for coherence in external relations and for an appropriate policy mix which balanced the needs of short term

responses to long term strategies. The speech stresses that “using the appropriate tools to achieve foreign policy objectives is not the same as imposing a security agenda on development assistance”.

Some have even been keen to point out that the new, more complex environment – what some call the development/foreign policy nexus – offers opportunities for the development community. “This doesn’t necessarily spell doom and gloom. If done properly on the basis of needs-based analysis and if the policy mechanisms are sophisticated a pooled approach can help”. For example, one interviewee argued that the fact that the EU was prepared to send peacekeepers to Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis) could lead to a long-term commitment to Africa that had been lacking in the past. “If you look at Artemis the member states are committed to long-term follow-up. It encourages political engagement in the problems of Africa”.

Many officials from the security/foreign policy sectors stressed the need for NGOs and development actors to engage in an active dialogue with them in order to see how the two sides could help each other on the basis of sharing knowledge and expertise. While the two worlds often failed to engage with each other, each side had already been forced to adopt the other’s way of thinking and further exchanges could prove productive, officials suggested. “The security world has been forced to reassess what we mean. We’ve been forced to talk the language of development and that should be welcomed”, said one, highlighting the impact of AIDS as a major security concern in southern Africa. Officials stressed that there had to be a more integrated approach between development cooperation and other policy tools. “In Bunia European peacekeepers were disarming children. What happens when they leave? Intervention is useless unless you put something in place and that requires a conversation between people responsible for different areas such as education, demobilisation, etc.” Another commented: “It’s inevitable that the development camp engages in discussion with the security camp to see how the two policy areas can be reconciled.” In his ODA speech Patten called on

*EU  
development  
policy*

*Challenges,  
threats and  
opportunities*

development actors to “come to the table prepared to explain to others in the external relations community what can and cannot be achieved through effective development programmes.”

The message to the development community from these interviews was clear. Development policy could not operate in isolation and that there were opportunities for development actors to have an input into the policy-making process to identify the most appropriate forms of action at different times in third countries. A dialogue with the secu-

rity community was possible and should be explored although the dangers of being coopted to non-development focused political goals is apparent. While actors should remain vigilant about the subversion of development resources for non-core activities, there was a chance for NGOs to bring their expertise and country knowledge to situations where otherwise the security/foreign policy worlds might only think in terms of military or police action or politically motivated sanctions which could reduce essential aid flows.

**3. PEACE FACILITY - DEVELOPMENT  
OR SECURITY STRATEGY AT  
WORK?**

The Peace Facility for Africa has provided the best recent example of the dilemmas and challenges of coordinating development policy with security concerns. One analyst called it a “crass example of pure taking precedence over development” while a Commission official said it was an example of “foreign policy and development cooperation going hand in hand”.

The Facility, which was approved by member states on March 31, provides €250 million over three years to fund peacekeeping activities in Africa. The money will come from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF)<sup>1</sup> from unspent funds and by shaving 1.5% off each country allocation. The proposal has brought to the fore all the concerns about keeping a balance between the two policy areas. All member states supported the proposal but there were reservations, shared by development NGOs, over the funding for the instrument which will provide support for peacekeeping operation in Africa. Germany in particular insisted that the funding solution should not set a precedent and in future such initiatives should be funded from the CFSP budget. Others were adamant that the facility should not finance soldiers’ wages but should concentrate on logistical support and institution building. This view was shared by MEPs on the Development Committee. At the same time as the proposal was being dis-

cussed there was an ongoing debate in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee over whether peacekeeping and other measures should qualify as development aid. Member states’ positions diverged in this discussion with some (the Netherlands) claiming that some activities should qualify while others (Sweden) insisted that they should not. In any case recent reports suggest that the debate is not advancing in the DAC. More importantly, however, member states stressed the importance of not waiting to settle the question of eligibility before approving the Peace Facility. “We didn’t want to make a resolution in the OECD a precondition”, said one member state official. Many warned that the DAC criteria should not be altered because this could open the way to countries like the US claiming that its massive peacekeeping expenditure qualified as development assistance. At the same time, the fact that not all of the activities financed under the Peace Facility qualify as ODA under the DAC definitions means that the EU will suffer a small fall in its ODA contributions. “We are prepared to take a small hit on DAC rather than changing definitions”, said one official. However, one Commission official called the current DAC definitions a “restraint” on action.

Addressing whether approval of the Peace Facility could open the door to similar initiatives and to the risk of diverting development resources for

<sup>1</sup>The European Development Fund is a Member State supported fund used to fund development in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries under the Cotonou Agreement. The Agreement runs from 2000 to 2020 but the Fund is replenished every five years on the basis of Member State voluntary contributions.

intrinsically security-focused projects, many interviewees, including member states' representatives, insisted that the Peace Facility was a "one-off", stressing that the possibility of funding a "European Expeditionary Force" with development resources was impossible from a legal and budgetary point of view. Commission officials stressed the notion of "ownership", i.e. that the countries of the African Union themselves had asked for this facility. "We will keep the methodology of ownership", said one Commission official as a safeguard against any attempts to divert development funds.

As one of the justifications of using the EDF money was that it might go unspent ("the EDF is a huge pot of virtual money. The more crises there are the

more the EDF remains virtual"), many officials expressed concern that there could be pressure to redirect EDF funds if there was major under-spending. "If there is a lot of money which isn't spent there is a risk but there is pressure not to do that", one official commented.

#### **Lessons to be drawn**

It looks unlikely under the current budget scenario that there will be a significant increase in the CFSP budget for 2007-13 to allow such initiatives to be funded from that budget line in future. There is therefore a need to ensure that the DAC eligibility criteria are not weakened in the OECD so that non-development focused activities are funded from non-development budget lines.

#### **4. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES - THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW COMMISSION**

Increasing the effectiveness of the European Union as a foreign policy actor was one of the key aims of the Convention which worked until July 2003 to draw up a draft Treaty for a Constitution for Europe. Its major innovation was a proposal to end the overlapping functions of the Commissioner for External Relations (currently Chris Patten) and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (currently Javier Solana). The Convention's recommendation was to merge the two offices into a European Foreign Minister so that the High Representative became the Commission Vice-president for external relations. The current existence of these two separate roles stems from the reluctance of the member states to entrust responsibility for foreign policy to the Commission. Instead, they created the post of High Representative for CFSP which only came into being in 1999 after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. The position was meant to improve coherence, effectiveness and representation in EU foreign policy.

Under the Convention's proposal, the European Foreign Minister (EFM), who would be appointed

by a qualified majority of the European Council, would chair the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (replacing the current rotating Presidency) and shall "contribute through his or her proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the European decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council of Ministers". The EFM would also have the right of initiative in the field of CFSP. This right would be exercised jointly with the Commission in areas where Community competence applied. During the discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference which took place under the Italian presidency member states sought to clarify the relations of the EFM to the Council and the Commission and suggested changes which stipulated that the minister would be operating on a mandate from the European Council in the field of CFSP. In the case of censure of the Commission, for example, the EFM would only resign from his/her duties relating to the Commission. The draft Constitution also says that the EFM would be assisted in fulfilling his or her mandate by a European External Action Service which would be made up of officials from

# EU development policy

## Challenges, threats and opportunities

the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the member states although the precise details are to be decided later. One EU official suggested that the formation of the new External Action Service could help overcome the traditional separations between security and development thinking which exist in national administrations and were often carried over into EU structures. “The new European Foreign Minister is a real opportunity. We have problems which have been exported from national administration, e.g. where the foreign and development ministries don’t talk”. The official suggested that the new service could be a chance to “build from the ground up” and incorporate experts in areas like development, trade and education as well as from the security sector into the team of advisors.

Abolishing the six month rotating presidency and replacing it with the EFM chairing the General Affairs Council and a new Council President who would serve for two years at a time (with the possibility of a further two year extension) would also help the Union to fix and concentrate on long-term political priorities.

### **Balance between foreign policy and other external actions**

The other key issue in the Convention/General Affairs Council debate has been the precise wording on the relation between foreign policy and other external actions. In the Convention text, Article III-193 paragraph 3 says: “The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies”. However, during the IGC talks the Italian Presidency tabled new wording which appeared to open the door to other external policies including development being subordinated to foreign policy. The document (available in French only) says: “Il (the EFM) veille à la cohérence de l’action de l’Union dans le domaine des relations extérieures avec la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (the EFM is responsible for ensuring the coherence of the Union’s actions in the field of external relations with the common foreign and security policy)”. However, this wording is opposed by the Commission and several member states and some have even challenged the legal validity of this

phrasing. Nevertheless, the development community should be vigilant to ensure that the Convention’s original wording is maintained in the final agreement on the Constitution.

### **Continuing commitment to development objectives**

In terms of development policy, the Convention maintained the existing Treaty commitments and incorporated them in Chapter IV on “Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid”. Article III-218 states: “Union policy in the sphere of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action... Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction, and in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

However, earlier drafts prepared by the Convention did not feature this explicit commitment to development and the language was only improved by the efforts of development NGOs, MEPs and some member states, notably Germany. Development NGOs which formed part of the Eurostep platform monitoring the Convention have highlighted a number of other areas of concern including the possibility of using humanitarian and development aid for foreign and defence policy purposes. They have asked for specific language which would rule out this possibility.

### **Convention text to stand with battle over EFM’s role**

From the first round of IGC discussions under the Italian Presidency it looks as though the Convention text will not be substantially amended further and that the main points of the draft will be part of the final deal – the EFM, the language on policy coherence, the Chapter on development policy and objectives. However, some member states are predicting that the final agreement on the role of the EFM and exactly how the role is balanced between the Community approach and inter-governmental approach of the Council could change. “There will be a fight over how the EFM works in practice and whether it is embedded in a

Commission or a Council context”, said one official. France and the UK are the two states which favour a stronger intergovernmental emphasis in this debate.

### Issue of composition of new Commission

While the changes introduced by the Constitution would only come into force from 2006 at the earliest, provided the text survives ratification, the composition of the new Commission which will take office in November 2004 represents the other major institutional issue for development policy. The key question here is whether the new line-up will continue to have a separate Commissioner for development and the responsibilities that person exercises. The structure of the new Commission will be the decision of the new Commission President who is expected to be announced at the June European Council meeting. Given that the Commission will expand from 20 to 25 members to give the ten acceding member states a position, the consensus view is that there will be a Commissioner development in the new team because the need will be to split existing portfolios to create new posts rather than eliminate existing ones. However, what is less clear, and more crucial, is what responsibilities Poul Nielson’s replacement will have. What seems likely is that there will be an external relations cluster working under the new European Foreign Minister/Commission Vice-president. This will probably be composed of a junior Commissioner

for external relations who will stand in for the EFM, a Commissioner dealing with enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (see below), one for trade and one for development. This goes one step beyond the existing system where the four external relations Commissioners (Patten, Lamy, Verheugen and Nielson) coordinate among themselves outside the full Commission meetings.

The main issue is the responsibility of the next Development Commissioner. There seems to be a broad consensus among member states that the figure should be responsible both for policy-making and execution. Development NGOs are arguing that the new Commissioner should have full control over those agencies responsible for implementation of policy so the Commissioner should be fully responsible for EuropeAid and ECHO to ensure better links between relief, reconstruction and development. At present, EuropeAid is supervised by a board made up of the external relations Commissioners and Pedro Solbes, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs with Chris Patten as Chairman, responsible for strategic management and Paul Nielson as Chief Executive, in charge of implementation of the policy guidelines.

## EU development policy

### Challenges, threats and opportunities

## 5. ENLARGEMENT

Although enlargement presents the development community with a number of opportunities, there are also widespread fears that the accession of ten new members states, eight from central and eastern Europe and two from the Mediterranean, threatens to weaken the EU’s poverty reduction focus. The rationale is that the new members will be more concerned about their immediate neighbourhood. This view is widely shared by member states. “It’s a given. It’s the reality of the politics of

the new Union”, commented one official. This view was confirmed by officials from the new member states themselves. “There is no secret that we will be fighting for more money for our neighbours”. But while the assumption that enlargement will reinforce the Union’s focus on its near abroad is widespread, the question of the precise effect on development policy and poverty reduction objectives is more differentiated.

*EU  
development  
policy*

*Challenges,  
threats and  
opportunities*

First, it is objectively the case that the new members have little or no experience of ODA and, in fact, some of them qualified for Overseas Assistance (OA) because of their low level of economic development. Some of them, however, have provided assistance to Socialist countries during the Soviet era and are keen to maintain contacts with states like Vietnam and Cuba. However, officials point out that they have signed up to the Community acquis on development policy including the commitments made at the Barcelona summit in March 2002 on the Millennium Development Goals. In its second annual report on member states efforts to deliver on their "Barcelona" commitments published in March, the Commission concluded that the 2004 enlargement would "not jeopardise the Barcelona commitment" to reach 0.39% of collective EU GNI as ODA by the year 2006. In fact, the EU25 would surpass this target and achieve 0.42% of GNI by 2006. Taken on their own, the ten provided 0.03% of their collective GNI in ODA in 2002 and could reach the level of 0.11% by 2006. When the Commission, which has been appointed by the member states to monitor the progress towards the Barcelona goals, is asked why it is not putting more pressure on the acceding states to reach the target of 0.33% of by 2006, it argues that the ten new states are starting from much further back and need to develop the appropriate legal and policy frameworks to implement their assistance. "From a development perspective you shouldn't have too much to fear. There are strong commitments from Monterrey and Barcelona which it would be difficult to change in the medium term," said one member state official.

Second, there are fears that the new members will argue for greater priority in EU spending to be given to their near neighbours. This different geographical emphasis is expected to emerge in the forthcoming discussions on the EU's financial perspectives for 2007-2013 (see below). Officials point out that the new members have already indicated the greater priority for geographically proximate regions in discussions on allocation criteria for external aid. At a Council debate in January on the effectiveness of external action, the Irish Presidency won support for an initiative which would extend current allocation criteria

"based on need and performance" to all EC external assistance. In practice this means applying the current Cotonou Agreement standards of partnership and poverty focus to other programmes. But to take account of concerns expressed by some of the acceding member states about dealing with local problems, a sentence was added saying that: "The particular difficulties faced by countries in crisis or in conflict must be borne in mind". So while there is no doubt that there is a greater political sensitivity to the near abroad, the question is whether the new members will be able to lobby successfully for a greater share of the budget resources within Heading 4 (External actions) to be used for the TACIS programme for Russia and the CIS countries, CARDS for the Western Balkans and the New Neighbourhood instrument (see below). One official predicted that given the balance of forces within the Council there would not be a major shift in spending towards Europe's near abroad. "I think it will stay more or less as it is", said one member state official. "There won't be a brutal reallocation of funds to the new neighbours", said another while a third commented: "I believe the commitment to development will be upheld in an enlarged Europe".

Development officials interviewed from the acceding countries make no secret of the fact that their emphasis will be on countries in their immediate neighbourhood. One official included Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro as two of seven priority countries for his country's development policy despite their relatively high income levels.

Some officials contested whether the EU was necessarily becoming more focused on its borders, pointing out that while most of its crisis management operations had been in the Balkans, Operation Artemis showed that it was taking an increasing interest in Africa. Officials also pointed out that France and the UK were giving a stronger focus on Africa within ESDP and highlighted the "Battlegroup Initiative" which aims to create smaller peacekeeping forces than those envisaged under the Rapid Reaction Force (see above) which could be used for crisis management in missions similar in scale and timeframe to Artemis.

## 6. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

In March 2003 the Commission published a Communication on “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our eastern and southern neighbours” (COM(2003) 104 final). The document set out the Union’s revised strategy – the European Neighbourhood Policy - for dealing with its new neighbours when the EU enlarges to take in ten new members on May 1. It outlines the EU’s priorities in dealing with these countries as: “to increase our mutual production, economic growth and external trade, to create an enlarged area of political stability and functioning rule of law and to foster the mutual exchange of human capital, ideas knowledge and culture”. It states that the EU “must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment”. The strategy is explicitly designed for those countries which do not have a realistic chance of being accepted as candidates for EU membership. It aims to stress that the EU will not become inward looking when it expands but will take a major interest in the stability, prosperity and democracy of its neighbours. The Communication speaks of creating a “zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ring of friends with whom the EU enjoys peaceful and cooperative relations”. The carrot for the countries covered by the strategy\* (which excludes the

Western Balkans and the Southern Caucasus, and Turkey as an official candidate) is “a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and the four freedoms - of persons, goods, services and capital”. The EU has formal relations with most of the countries covered by the strategy (Libya being a notable exception) and so relations will build on the actions scheduled under existing programmes. The key elements of the strategy will be enhanced political cooperation, especially in addressing common security threats and conflict prevention, economic reform and development, the internal market (especially trade liberalisation and cooperation on energy and transport), justice and home affairs cooperation, development of infrastructure networks, and people-to-people contacts.

One of the key questions for the development community is the share of money devoted to this policy under the forthcoming Financial Perspective proposals (see below). In any event it is clear that a combination of enlargement with ten new countries who border the regions covered by the policy and a greater EU focus on security concerns will increase the Union’s focus in these areas, in terms of both financial and political resources.

\* Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus

## 7. FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES 2007 - 13 AND EDF BUDGETISATION

By the end of 2005 the 25 members of the EU should have agreed the Union’s budget framework (the financial perspectives) for 2007-13. Linked to this is the fate of the European Development Fund which comes up for renewal in 2008.

The effectiveness of EU external relations policy is a key concern of the Commission’s Communication “Building our common future – Policy challenges and budgetary means of the Enlarged Union 2007 -2013) published on February 19, 2004 (COM(2004) 101 Final). “Europe

*EU  
development  
policy*

*Challenges,  
threats and  
opportunities*

*EU  
development  
policy*

*Challenges,  
threats and  
opportunities*

must be a strong global player”, it states, saying that: “Only through the existence and efficiency of common action can we translate our values and political declarations into reality. We will never be able to respond to crisis in Europe or elsewhere without common instruments and the resources to make them work”.

The first point about the Commission Communication, which will be followed by formal proposals in July, is that the Prodi Commission has called for the EU budget as the percentage of Gross National Income to rise to 1.14% as opposed to around 0.98% at current levels. This figure has already been challenged by a group of six net contributors to the budget (the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria) who are calling for the percentage to be limited to 1%. In real terms 1.14% would mean a budget of €114 billion in 2007 rising to €143 billion (in terms of payments) in 2013. The current budget heading would be slightly modified to create a new heading of sustainable growth (taking in structural funds and spending on competitiveness) and preservation and management of natural resources which would include agricultural spending. Following the Brussels summit deal in 2002 farm spending has been fixed until 2013 regardless of the outcome of the negotiations over the 2007–2013 budget. The old heading 4 external relations is renamed: “The EU as a global player”. This heading would be allocated €11.232 billion in 2006, rising to €15.740 bn in 2013 compared to €5.130 bn for the existing heading 4 under the current financial perspective. However, this figure includes the budgetisation of the EDF from 2008 (roughly €4bn), the inclusion of €1.6–2 bn in pre-accession aid (which was previously a separate budget line) and the incorporation of administrative expenses relating to the implementation of external policies (roughly €1.4 bn). So the increase between 2006 and 2007 in actual terms is around one-third, given that from 2007 Bulgaria and Romania are anticipated to join the Union and will therefore no longer require the €1.6 bn budgeted for pre-accession aid.

The question is what are the allocations within this overall budget heading to the different regional programmes (ALA, MEDA, TACIS, etc.) The

New Neighbours are expected to be allocated around €800 million although this sum represents a continuation of funding available under the existing MEDA and TACIS programmes.

The other area which will see a significant injection of funds is the EU’s New Neighbours Instrument (NNI). The instrument is designed to accompany the EU’s Wider Europe – Neighbourhood strategy which will cover relations with the border countries of an enlarged Europe (see above). While the countries involved will continue to receive assistance through the relevant regional programmes (TACIS, MEDA, etc) the New Neighbours Instrument will focus on funding cross-border projects which are currently administratively difficult to fund because of variations in procedures for the different regional strategies. According to the Commission’s Communication on the financial perspectives, the NNI will focus on promoting sustainable economic development and social development of these border regions, ensuring the smooth functioning and secure management of these border regions, addressing common challenges facing the EU and its neighbours like environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organised crime”.

The Commission has said that it wants a simplification of the different instruments covered within the existing heading from around 100 different instruments to around six. These would include two new instruments (which could be merged at a later stage): economic cooperation and development; and peace and security. The Communication says that these should replace the existing “plethora of geographic or thematically-based instruments” and would include the integration of the EDF into the EU budget. There would continue to be a separate instrument for humanitarian aid, a new instrument would replace the three programmes for candidate countries (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD) in addition to the new neighbourhood instrument targeted at cross-border cooperation between the enlarged Union and neighbouring countries. The sixth instrument would concern macro-economic financial assistance.

Despite the Commission’s wish to move to two

instruments it seems likely that it will propose maintaining the existing regional programmes (ALA, MEDA, TACIS, etc) even though there are voices in the Commission who would like to see these regional divisions scrapped altogether.

It should be noted that the EU's nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy has very little impact on the EU budget as military or police missions are funded by those member states who provide personnel or equipment according to the "costs fall where they lie principle". It is only "common" normally administrative costs of operations that can be funded from the budget as in the case of missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM. Some analysts believe that the advent of the European Foreign Minister with an External Service could lead to more "common" costs to the budget for EU crisis management missions.

### **Budgetisation of the European Development Fund**

The other key issue linked to the budget debate is the question of whether the European Development Fund is integrated into the EU budget. The Commission called for this move in a Communication issued on October 8, 2004, saying that it would increase public accountability (by allowing the European Parliament to have scrutiny over this spending as it does over the EU budget) and increase efficiency by harmonising the rules for financing and spending with other parts of the EU budget. Integration of the EDF into the budget also forms part of the Commission's ideas on the 2007-13 financial perspectives. On current analysis, it looks very unlikely that the member states will agree to budgetisation. At least three current member states - the UK, Ireland and Spain - are strongly opposed while Greece and Portugal are also against. There is also strong opposition from the acceding member states led by the Czech Republic which was expressed at a meeting of development ministers in Trieste in 2003. Budgetising the EDF would mean increases in those countries' contributions because the EU budget calculates each member state's bill on the basis of Gross National Income while the EDF is freely negotiated. "We think that under multilateral negotiations we will be able to negotiate less", said a development expert from a new member

state. For historical reasons France is a disproportionate contributor.

### **Insistence of ringfencing ACP funds**

While there is some support for moving the EDF into the mainstream budget it is clear that this would only happen with significant safeguards including ringfencing of the money within the "economic cooperation and development" budget line to ensure that it could not be used for other purposes. Several member states are also insisting that several of the current features of the Cotonou Agreement are transferred if this money is integrated including greater programming flexibility so unused funds are not lost and comanagement with the ACP states. One official went as far as to say that his country was seeking "EDF-isation of the budget".

### **Bid to increase budget flexibility**

Another element of the Commission's Communication is for greater flexibility to shift funds between budget lines, something which is excluded under the current system. In a foreign policy/development context, this would help deal with situations in future where unforeseen regional crises required additional funds. In recent years, extra money has been needed for Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. While some of the requirements have been met out of the €200 million "flexibility reserve", money for Afghanistan, for example, was found by shifting fund from within the ALA budget for Asia and Latin America. Commission officials pointed out that this did not entail a reduction in the EU's poverty reduction focus because the move represented a transfer from middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America to Afghanistan, one of the poorest states in the world. Member states officials admitted, nevertheless, that the decision had meant that "we were able to do less on development than we would have been otherwise". However, member states interviewed for this report were reluctant to support giving the Commission the flexibility it requests in the budget Communication. "We won't give them carte blanche", commented one.

## 8. THE EU SECURITY STRATEGY A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD

The EU's Security Strategy was approved by EU heads of state and government at the Brussels European Council on December 12, 2003. Work on the document began during the Greek Presidency in the first half of 2003 and the exercise was seen as an attempt to produce a response to the change in US strategic thinking, in particular the use of pre-emptive strikes, which in part paved the way for the war in Iraq. It was an attempt to show that the European Union took global security threats as seriously as the US but to lay down the Union's specific reactions to them and proposed courses of action. In particular there was a strong emphasis on multilateral institutions, which reflected criticism of the current US administration as being "unilateralist" and unwilling to engage with international institutions like the UN or sign up to international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol on global warming.

The strategy paper, titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World" outlines the problems in the modern world and contrasts them with a Europe "which has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free". While it stresses the importance of the US in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO, it states that "no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own". "Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world", it argues. In identifying the global challenges and key threats, it stresses the link between economic conditions and security issues. "In much of the developing world poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns," the strategy states, adding: "Security is a precondition of development". In terms of the key threats, the paper identifies the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as "potentially the greatest threat to our security" (in a previous version this was the "single most important threat"). Terrorism, regional conflicts, state failures and organised crime are also singled out and there is an emphasis on how the different factors are

inter-linked e.g. regional security can fuel the demand for WMD, terrorist groups could acquire WMD, state failure adds to regional instability and allows organised crime or terrorism to flourish, etc. The strategy says that, unlike the Cold War threat of invasion, the first line of defence against the new threats will be abroad and the EU should act quickly to trigger conflict and threat prevention. Military means will not be sufficient to tackle the new threats which will require a mixture of instruments, it states. The strategy cites export controls, political and economic pressure, intelligence gathering, police, judicial and military action, humanitarian aid, economic assistance and civilian crisis management among others. The EU is particularly well-equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations, it states.

One of the key ways of dealing with security threats is "to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the border of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (see Section on Wider Europe above).

To counter these threats depends on an effective multilateral system leading to "the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order". Primacy for the maintenance of international peace and security is given to the United Nations Security Council while there are references to the role of the World Trade Organisation, the International Financial Institutions and regional organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN and Mercosur.

The strategy insists that "the quality of international society depends on the quality of governments that are its foundation" and stresses the importance of good governance, anti-corruption, the rule of law and protecting human rights. "Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform, it states, while con-

tributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in the Union's policy".

In terms of what action the Union might take against states that fail to live up to these standards, it warns countries that refuse to rejoin the international community: "there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union", although it does not spell out what this might be.

In terms of policy implications, it says the Union should be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives, applying the "full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities". The Union should "develop a security culture which fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention". It stresses "preventive engagement" to avoid more serious problems in the future. There is a call for more resources for military capabilities while making forces more flexible and mobile.

There is also a stress on greater coherence. "The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities; European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from the Member States and other instruments". Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agen-

da, it stresses. There should be greater coherence not only among EU instruments but also among member states. Objectives should be pursued through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnership with key actors.

Assessments of how the strategy will affect the balance between security concerns and development policy are mixed. Some officials dismissed the strategy as merely "restating what have been our policies for years", while others predicted that it would bring a new and much needed focus on security considerations. The Commission is believed to be preparing a Communication on how to integrate the strategy's priorities into policy-making in the near future.

#### **Implications for development**

The implications for development policy depend on the extent to which member states are prepared to maintain a balance between development objectives and the policy goals of counter-terrorism and the fight against WMD and honour the commitment inherent in the document to focusing on poverty reduction as a key instrument in the effort to prevent regional conflict, societal breakdown, mass migration and political disaffection which breeds terrorism and support for extremist groups. While much in the strategy was written to emphasise the continuing commitment to traditional development goals, development groups should ensure that the strategy's priorities do not lead to a skewing of policy towards pure security concerns (see below).

## **9. THE WAR AGAINST TERROR, WMD AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION**

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US and March 11, 2004 in Madrid have driven the fight against terrorism to the top of the EU's agenda. Following the September 11 attacks, EU heads of state and government held an emergency meeting in Brussels at which they agreed that the fight against terrorism would be a "priority objective of

the European Union". It approved an action plan to step up its efforts to combat terrorism in which it asks the General Affairs Council "systematically to evaluate the EU's relations with third countries in the light of the support which those countries might give to terrorism".

*EU  
development  
policy*

*Challenges,  
threats and  
opportunities*

Following UN Security Council Resolution 1373 which lays down requirements for legislative and other action to be taken to prevent and combat terrorism, the Commission has examined its external aid programmes in order to determine to what extent they support activities in line with Resolution 1373. An internal Commission document SEC(2002) 231 identifies a long list of activities ranging from projects to tackle money laundering, efforts to fight organised crime, help to customs authorities, border control projects, programmes dealing with migration issues, judicial cooperation, police and law enforcement, and anti-drugs projects. These took place throughout the different regions where the EU is active in providing assistance. It also stated that such projects would “have an even higher priority for the Commission than in the past” although it pointed out that EC external assistance was focused on specific development objectives and that scope for assistance is determined by its compatibility with the objectives established for that country.

Following the Madrid train bombing on March 11, EU leaders met again. They issued a Declaration on fighting terrorism which contained new strategic objectives for a revised action plan. This included a commitment to “target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorism capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced”. It also states that the Union would “develop technical assistance strategies, to facilitate Third countries in enhancing their counter-terrorism capability and by addressing counter-terrorism concerns into all relevant external assistance programmes to promote good governance and the rule of law; ensure that counter-terrorism is a key element of political dialogue at all levels with Third countries; and analyse and evaluate the commitment of countries to combat terrorism on an ongoing basis. This will be an influencing factor in EU relations with them. Under the revised objectives it says that counter-terrorist objectives should be “mainstreamed into the work of the geographical working groups and external assistance programmes”.

### **Weapons of Mass Destruction**

At the General Affairs Council of November 2003, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to include a clause on non-proliferation in agreements with third countries. The EU is also expected to add a requirement that third countries should sign up to the International Criminal Court.

### **Illegal immigration**

The fight against illegal immigration has also moved up the political agenda. At the Seville European Council in March 2002, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish Premier José Maria Aznar pushed for the possibility of cutting aid to third countries if they failed to cooperate on matters of asylum and immigration. Following resistance led by French President Jacques Chirac and Swedish Premier Göran Persson this was deleted. However, the final conclusions said that “insufficient cooperation” with the EU by third countries in combating illegal immigration could “hamper the development of closer relations between that country and the Union”. However, the conclusions restate the Union’s position that all new third country agreements should include a readmission clause requiring states to take back illegal immigrants who have passed through their territory on the way to entering the EU.

MEPs expressed strong concern about these conditionalities. One called the clauses on counter-terrorism “untenable and unacceptable” and said the Council’s statements on terrorism showed a complete misunderstanding of the causes of terrorism. However, member state officials stressed that the EU was serious about these forms of conditionality as a test of whether third countries deserved assistance. “We are considering what are the framework conditions to have effective development policy. If a country doesn’t agree to fight terrorism then the political will is probably not there”. However, another warned of the risk of political distortion of development goals. “After the atrocities in Madrid it might be politically difficult to uphold the view that development is something you don’t want to subject to foreign policy guidelines”. Commissioner Patten in his

November speech at the ODI insisted that assistance to countries to fight terrorism played a role in poverty reduction. He explained that the EU had reassessed its technical assistance with a view to helping partner countries improve their ability to combat and suppress terrorism, giving the example of helping states with strengthening institutional capacity to deal with money laundering, for example. He also cited assistance given to three countries (Philippines, Pakistan and Indonesia) to fight money-laundering or terrorist financing which, he said, ensured overall coherence with the Union's longer term assistance programmes. He commented: "I am confident that a well-designed border control strategy which reduces the risk of another Bali bombing does have a role to play in lifting Indonesia out of poverty".

Development NGOs have expressed concern at recent discussions in the OECD on how to associate poverty reduction with the fight against terrorism. In April 2003 a high level meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) endorsed a policy statement 'A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action'.

Members of the Global Security and Development Network warned that despite recognising the importance of poverty reduction and human rights, several sections of the DAC paper may be interpreted as opening the door for the re-direction of aid away from poverty reduction and towards a counter-terrorism and security agenda. There is grave concern that the counter-terrorism and security agenda risks violating fundamental human rights and further marginalizing the poor and disenfranchised (see <http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/gsdjoint.htm>).

Even if there are fears that the Union's new focus on fighting terrorism could lead to a shift in funds towards such projects, MEPs question whether this could happen. "The Council can't make the Commission do that. We wouldn't let it happen", said a Socialist Parliamentarian. This view seemed to be borne out by the member states themselves. "There is a real danger (of development being diverted) but there are the Millennium Development Goals. We can't get out of them easily and go in other directions. There are legally binding Council conclusions. We will review it next year and if it seems that money had gone to counter-terrorism we couldn't get away with it politically".

## 10. TRADE POLICY

The relation of trade and development was identified by many interviewees as key and in many ways more important than the security/development debate. Several officials stressed that EU trade policy did more to undermine development objectives than any other single issue despite the Union's commitment to integrate development concerns into other policies. "From a development perspective trade policy is a disaster", commented one. "Trade policy is more important than ODA increases", said another member state official. Commission officials were keen to stress the recent progress made in modifying EU trade policy and in particular the agricultural aspects. "We have moved from trade distorting measures to

non-trade distorting ones. We are freezing expenditures while bringing ten new member states who will also get subsidies. We have moved from supporting products to supporting farmers and the environment". They highlighted concessions like Everything But Arms (which grants duty-free access to the world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs) for most agricultural and industrial products with some notable exceptions (sugar, bananas and rice) and special arrangements for sensitive goods like beef) as proof that "agricultural policy making was no longer dominating trade policy making as in the past". They also pointed out the EU's support for cotton growing African nations. Commission officials argued that

## *EU development policy*

### *Challenges, threats and opportunities*

the recent achievements illustrated a change in thinking within the Council and Commission and a realisation that “things cannot go on as they are”. Nevertheless, they admitted that it would take a long time to radically reform the CAP in a way that would meet developing countries’ needs. “You cannot imagine that you can transform a policy on which the Union was founded in a couple of years”, one senior official commented. Member state development officials praised the work of NGOs in drawing public attention to the effects of trade policy on developing countries. “We welcome what they do because it helps us in our development objectives”. Spending on the CAP has been fixed until 2013 by the Brussels summit in October 2002 at around €43 bn a year. In 2002 ODA commitments from the EU budget totalled €6.5 billion.

In terms of what successful completion of the Doha Round could achieve, officials highlight the Union’s offer to abolish exports refunds for products of interest to developing countries. They point to the food security box as a safeguard for food importing countries and the principle of Special and Differential Treatment. But crucially what is most at stake is whether developing countries, particularly middle income states, will agree to open up their own markets in the round. Commission officials admit that there are few incentives for ACPs to make concessions in the round and that they fear losing the trade preferences they enjoy. But officials stress that less developed countries could benefit enormously if middle income states agree to reduce their tariff

barriers. “The question is whether the G20 can make an offer to the G90”, one official commented.

Whilst many NGOs agree that the failure of the WTO Ministerial in Cancun was a missed opportunity they do not share the Commission’s view that other developing countries have more to do than the very richest countries including the EU. Elimination of agricultural subsidies, the further opening up of industrial markets in the North, and the rights of developing countries to protect their small farmers, are all urgently needed. Cancun was unlikely to have secured all of these, but some progress could have been made with potentially huge gains for poor people.

## CONCLUSIONS

EU development policy is confronting a series of difficult challenges over the next five years. There will be pressures from a wide number of sources which threaten to dilute poverty reduction objectives. The enlargement of the European Union to take in ten countries with little or no history of overseas assistance will certainly pose problems in terms of integrating development goals into the new members' planning and spending processes and set new challenges in terms of policy coordination. But it does introduce ten new countries as ODA donors, commit them to contributing towards the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals and to raising their ODA levels to 0.33% of GNI by 2006. There is no secret that their entry will increase the Union's focus on its near abroad as the imperative of political stability on the EU's expanded border moves even higher up the political agenda. Significant resources will be dedicated to promoting regional development and integration, both in the economic and political spheres.

Agreeing a new EU budget for 2007-13 also brings threats for development policy. The negotiations will take place under very strict financial constraints and the six biggest contributors to the EU budget have already indicated that they want to cap spending at 1% of EU GNI. This will put pressure on development spending as much as other areas. One MEP commented: "The proposals for 1% will hit development and hit the poorest regions". It looks unlikely that member states will agree to integrate the European Development Fund into the EU budget but there are already signs that some member states including lead donor France may reduce its contribution to the fund, preferring instead to use bilateral aid to meet its Monterrey Commitments.

But the biggest challenges to development policy come from the rising importance of security concerns and, in particular, the focus on the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. NGOs have already warned that the world's

poorest nations could be deprived of essential funding undermining key poverty eradication strategies.

What the interviews show is that despite broad consensus in some areas (for example the fact that development policy cannot operate in isolation from other policies) in other areas there is plenty of nuance and outright disagreement, presenting myriad opportunities for influencing the direction of discussions. The separate chapters in this report on security, trade and new neighbour policies clearly indicate that each will require more resources yet the largest contributors to the EU budget are proposing fewer. This presents development actors with two immediate challenges: Over the coming months it is vital for development actors to build a compelling case for the maintenance of an independent development policy where allocations by country and activity are taken on the basis of poverty indicators and not on the basis of the EU's own security agenda. Second while it is clear that this independent policy must be linked to the EU's other external policies and draw on common resources, it must also be made clear that new priorities require new resources.

## *EU development policy*

### *Challenges, threats and opportunities*

# act:onaid international

For further information contact  
**brussels@actonaid.org**  
or visit **www.actonaid.org**

ActionAid International is a unique partnership of  
people who are fighting for a better world - a world  
without poverty.

## **ActionAid International**

Brussels office  
10 rue de la Science  
1000 Bruxelles, Belgique

- **Tel** 32 2 503 24 22
- **Fax** 32 2 502 62 03
- *brussels@actonaid.org*
- *www.actonaid.org*